Abstract
Introduction
The highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 strain is listed as a biological select agent by the United States Department of Agriculture-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS, 2010). Although rare, humans can become infected with H5N1 for which the mortality rate was approximately 60% between the years of 2003 (World Health Organization, 2010 . The heightened concerns regarding public health risks associated with H5N1 exposure have promoted an increase in studies evaluating vaccines (El Sahly & Keitel, 2008; Leroux-Roels & Leroux-Roels, 2009 ). Such studies increase the potential for human exposure to H5N1; therefore, as more laboratory studies are conducted, safety considerations must include information on how long H5N1 can remain infective on surfaces outside of a host, as well as demonstrating decontamination of this virus.
The environmental persistence of biological agents is an important piece of information needed to estimate the residual risk of transmission and infectivity. The duration of biological agent viability with respect to the environmental matrix (e.g., water, soil, fomite) and conditions such as temperature and relative humidity can help determine the appropriate decontamination approach needed to treat an exposure site (Sinclair et al., 2008) . For biological agents, most environmental persistence studies have focused on spores and vegetative bacteria (Sinclair et al., 2008) . It is known that highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (e.g., H5N1) can persist in water for days during which time viability is affected by water temperature and salinity Stallknecht et al., 1990) . However, little is known about the persistence of these viruses on surfaces. Recently, a study was conducted to examine the persistence of H5N1 as a function of surface material and environmental conditions, including temperature, relative humidity, and simulated sunlight (Wood et al., 2010) . The work by Wood et al. (2010) showed that H5N1 can persist for days when inoculated onto soil, feces, glass, and galvanized metal in which colder temperatures and lower relative humidity enable H5N1 to survive longer outside the host.
Gaseous and vaporous decontaminants can treat large spaces and provide extensive surface area coverage. A common approach in many scientific fields is the use of vaporous hydrogen peroxide, which has been shown to be effective in surface inactivation of biological agents, such as Bacillus anthracis spores as well as the vegetative bacteria Brucella suis, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Francisella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis (Canter, 2005; Rogers et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2010) . The inactivation of H5N1 has been demonstrated by using heat and aqueous chemical treatments (Rice et al., 2007; Thomas & Swayne, 2007; Wanaratana et al., 2010) ; however, such inactivation has not been demonstrated for surfaces contaminated with H5N1. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of 
Materials and Methods

Test Materials
All testing was performed under biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) enhanced conditions. The A/Vietnam/1203/04 H5N1 strain (Clade 1) used in this study was propagated in eggs and harvested in allantoic fluid. The decontamination chamber was a custom-made BSL-3 aerosol research and component assessment (ARCA) chamber (The Baker Company, Sanford, ME) designed for largescale testing and evaluation of sensors, detectors, and decontaminants. This ARCA chamber has an internal volume and surface area of approximately 15 m 3 and 59 m 2 , respectively. Glass (microscope slides; Fisher HealthCare, Houston, TX), a 2.0 cm x 2.0 cm piece cut from an intact Hypalon ® glove (The Baker Company), and 1.5 cm x 6.5 cm stainless steel (Adept Products, Inc., West Jefferson, OH) coupons were used as the test material surfaces. All coupons were autoclaved and visually assessed for damage prior to testing.
Decontamination Procedure
Each test material was inoculated in a Biological Safety Cabinet (BSC) Class III with approximately 7.7 log10 TCID50 (median 50% tissue culture infectious dose)/mL by dispensing ten, 10 µL droplets across each surface and dried for 1 hour at room temperature (20º ± 2ºC). Three inoculated coupons and one blank (not inoculated) were used for decontamination and two sets of inoculated coupons (N=3/material) and blanks (N=1/ material) were used as controls. The first control set was used to monitor potential decreases in H5N1 viability during the 1-hour drying time. The second set of control coupons was maintained in a separate, isolated BSC III during the decontamination run.
In parallel, 16 biological indicators (BI) that contained approximately 6.0 log10 Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores on stainless steel disks sealed in Tyvek ® pouches (Apex Laboratories, Inc., Apex, NC) and 16 VHP Chemical Indicator (CI) NB305 strips (STERIS Corporation, Mentor, OH) were placed at separate locations within the ARCA chamber for evaluating the decontamination process. A single BI and CI affixed to the outside of the ARCA were used as controls.
The decontamination procedure was performed with the VHP ® 1000ED Biodecontamination System (STERIS Corporation) using previously established fumigation parameters (Rogers et al., 2009 ) that consisted of dehumidification (10 min; 6.9 mg/L relative humidity), conditioning (20 min; 6.5 g/min hydrogen peroxide), decontamination (5.5 h; 5.0 g/min hydrogen peroxide), and aeration phases (> 4 h). These parameters were developed for the decontamination of the ARCA chamber against various biological agents prior to the entry of personnel into the chamber. During the run, the hydrogen peroxide concentration, relative humidity, and temperature were monitored in real-time using a data point capture frequency of 1 minute as previously described (Rogers et al., 2009 ).
Sample Processing
All control and decontaminated material coupons were individually placed into 50 mL conical tubes containing 10 mL of sterile phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) (Sigma, St. Louis, MO) and extracted by mechanical agitation of the tubes at 200 rpm on an orbital shaker for 15 minutes at room temperature. Following extraction, a 1.0 mL aliquot of each extract was removed and 10-fold serial dilutions were prepared in sterile cell culture medium. Aliquots (0.1 mL) of each dilution were transferred to five wells of a 96-well plate containing Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cell monolayers. Cells were cultured at 37º ± 2ºC under 5% CO2 in a humidified incubator for approximately 96 hours and cytopathic effects (CPE) determined visually using light microscopy. The TCID50/mL was calculated using the Spearman-Kärber formula (Hamilton et al., 1977) and expressed as the mean ± standard deviation (SD) log10 TCID50 for H5N1. The calculated TCID50/mL was multiplied by a factor of 10 (accounting for extraction buffer volume), yielding total TCID50. The assay limit of detection was determined to be 2.12 log10 TCID50/mL (3.12 log10 TCID50 total) using the trimmed Spearman-Kärber method (Hamilton et al., 1977) .
Statistical Analysis
The t-test (MS Excel) (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA) was used to compare the mean log10 TCID50 between the 1-hour drying controls and the nondecontaminated controls. P0.05 was used as the level for significance. Following decontamination, BI were removed from the ARCA chamber, placed into 50 mL conical tubes containing 20 mL of tryptic soy broth (Remel, Lexena, KS), cultured at 55º-60ºC, and visually inspected for growth or no growth at 1 and 7 days' incubation. All CI were visually inspected for color change.
Results
During the decontamination run, the hydrogen peroxide concentration of the conditioning phase peaked to approximately 370 ppm and decreased to a level of approximately 260 ppm during the decontamination phase. The relative humidity also peaked during conditioning to approximately 92% and slowly decreased during the decontamination phase. The mean (±SD) temperature in the ARCA during the decontamination run was 22.0º ± 0.5ºC. Figure 1 provides the real-time hydrogen peroxide concentration, temperature, and relative humidity profiles in the ARCA chamber during the entire decontamination run. In the control chamber for both runs, the temperature and relative humidity ranged between 22º-24ºC and 40%-50%, respectively.
Following decontamination, all chemical indicator strips present in the ARCA chamber during the decontamination run changed color, indicating exposure to the vaporous hydrogen peroxide. The control chemical indicator strips did not change color. All BI exposed to vaporous hydrogen peroxide showed no growth after 7 days of incubation; the unexposed BI exhibited growth at 1 and 7 days. Upon visual inspection, no physical damage was observed for the hydrogen peroxide-exposed coupons.
For the 1-hour drying controls, the mean total H5N1 virus recovered from glass, Hypalon ® glove, and stainless steel as determined by CPE was 7.1, 7.7, and 6.6 log10 TCID50, respectively. For the non-decontaminated controls that were processed at 19-20 hours after drying, the mean total virus concentration was significantly lower (P0.05) than the 1-hour controls and ranged from 4.2 log10 TCID50 on both stainless steel and Hypalon ® glove to 4.3 log10 TCID50 on glass. Exposure to vaporous hydrogen peroxide fumigation resulted in the reduction of viable H5N1 as indicated by the lack of observable CPE in the MDCK cultures (Table 1) . The control and decontamination blanks were negative for CPE.
Discussion
The present study demonstrates that the viability of A/Vietnam/1203/2004 H5N1 decreased when inoculated on three material surfaces and exposed to vaporous hydrogen peroxide within a large aerosol-generating chamber. In parallel, BI containing G. stearothermophilus spores exposed to vaporous hydrogen peroxide were completely inactivated as demonstrated by the lack of growth (no turbidity) in the liquid cultures after 7 days of incubation, providing a qualitative assessment for evaluating decontamination performance. Highly pathogenic Figure 1 Real-time profile of hydrogen peroxide concentration, relative humidity, and temperature in the ARCA chamber during the decontamination run.
avian influenza viruses can persist in water, soil, feces, and non-porous surfaces for days, but can be inactivated by heat and chemical treatment (Rice et al., 2007; Thomas & Swayne, 2007; Wanaratana et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2010) . To our knowledge, this is the first study demonstrating that the A/Vietnam/1203/2004 H5N1 strain inoculated onto three non-porous material surfaces exhibits reduced viability as a function of drying and is further inactivated when exposed to vaporous hydrogen peroxide within a large-scale chamber. These observations are consistent with that of Heckert et al. (1997) in which the viability of an H5N2 strain decreased approximately 2.8 to 5.9 log10 when dried on steel and glass for 16 hours. Moreover, exposure to vapor-phase hydrogen peroxide resulted in 0 ELD50 of H5N2 on glass and steel surfaces (Heckert et al., 1997) .
The recovery of H5N1 from glass, Hypalon ® glove, and stainless steel after the 1-hour drying was at least 86% (~6.6 log10 TCID50) of the inoculum, suggesting this short period of time does not have much of an effect on the H5N1 viability. These values are virtually identical to the percentage of H5N1 recovered from galvanized metal and glass after a 1-hour drying time when log transforming the values reported by Wood et al. (2010) . By the end of the decontamination run in the current study, the control coupons exhibited H5N1 viability at approximately 1-log above the limit of detection. This indicates that the viability of H5N1 decreases as a function of time on non-porous surfaces, supporting previous observations (Wood et al., 2010) . The results of the present study and those reported by Wood et al. (2010) suggest that H5N1 can remain a contact hazard for risk of human exposure, requiring the addition of a decontaminant treatment to completely inactivate this virus. However, it is possible that if given enough time under certain environmental conditions, the viability of H5N1 may decrease to below detection levels.
When making informed decisions regarding the potential health risks associated with H5N1 surface contamination, it is important to generate data demonstrating the inactivation of this virus. The present study shows that exposure to vaporous hydrogen peroxide promotes further reduction in the viability of H5N1 on nonporous surfaces. Based on the trimmed SpearmanKärber method (Hamilton et al., 1977) , the assay used to quantify the virus has a limit of detection at 3.12 log10 TCID50. Therefore, it is possible that some viable H5N1 remains on the test surface that is not detectable with the present assay, suggesting that a more sensitive assay or quantitative approach may be needed to provide a higher level of confidence in determining the complete inactivation of H5N1. Currently, no criterion has been established to determine an appropriate level of surface decontamination for H5N1; however, complete inactivation is the current requirement for remediation of Bacillus anthracis on surfaces (Canter, 2005) . The data presented in this study may help in addressing such a requirement; however, more data need to be collected in future studies that evaluate additional variables such as complex material types (e.g., porous surfaces), the effects of temperature, relative humidity, and the presence of bioburden. Demonstrating that the viability of H5N1 decreases significantly on surfaces over time and can be further reduced with vaporous hydrogen peroxide can help provide information to decision makers with respect to safe entry into a remediated site. Reflecting the critical threat posed by biological warfare and terrorism in a post 9-11 world, Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare (an update of Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare published in 1997) addresses the weaponization of biological agents, categorizing potential agents as food, waterborne, or agricultural agents or toxins, and discusses their respective epidemiology. Recent advances in biomedical knowledge are presented that include descriptions of individual agents and the illnesses induced. Authors discuss biotoxins and explain methods for early identification for anthrax, plague, smallpox, alphaviruses, and staphylococcal enterotoxins. Case studies and research on successful management practices, treatments, and antidotes are also included. Publisher: Department of Defense, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Borden Institute. (2007), 672 pages; illustrated. Available at: www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/biological_warfare/biological.html
